GDA2

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DCRBrown
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Re: GDA2

Post by DCRBrown »

N66,
Perhaps 1 dice per two bases, or part thereof?
I must congratulate you on the resourcefulness of your Intelligence gathers! :o

DB
baxterj
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Re: GDA2

Post by baxterj »

Let’s say you have a larger skirmish screen with say 6 bases. Currently that means 4 D6, hitting on a 5 or 6. Amending it as per my suggestion means it would be 6 x D6 hitting on a 6 only. That reduces the effectiveness in my view.
Simmerson
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Re: GDA2

Post by Simmerson »

Dave, certainly agree with your examples. Can’t get the idea out of my head now of when a brigade goes hesitant that I set their status to eating strawberries.

The balance over history and a game. Just with smaller scales it can take quite a number of turns to move so hesitancy is quite detrimental as often as it can be prolonging the game.I assume with 28mm or even 15 it’s not really an issue as most perhaps do not have access to overly large tables or more than a few brigades per side.

Only my vote for a wee tweak to the rules or even better as an optional rule for those playing with tiny soldiers like me.
nikjen66
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Re: GDA2

Post by nikjen66 »

Hi Baxter. If I have 4 skirmish bases rolling I dice per base I can inflict a max of 4 hits, and that could be devastating! Needing 6s to hit makes this unlikely but, possible. If I only roll one dice per two bases my 4 bases have a maximum of 2 hits, but if I need to roll 5&6 the chances of hitting are greater (1:3 rather than 1:6) therefore making them more likely to hit but not overwhelmingly so. Maybe not as effective (in the extreme) but more efficient/reliable. 😊
Last edited by nikjen66 on Tue Jun 29, 2021 8:07 am, edited 2 times in total.
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ShadowDragon
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Re: GDA2

Post by ShadowDragon »

My 2 cents:

I'm in the camp of minimal changes.

1. I'd be careful about messing about with the skirmish rules - e.g., more dice hitting on a '6' significantly increases the chance for a double-six and a DT which is important for determining skirmisher-to-skirmisher combat. I know that some feel that skirmishers are too powerful. I don't feel that to be so. For too many Napoleonic rules skirmishers were close to irrelevant and yet they must have been significant - otherwise why the historical trend at the time to increase skirmishing power? 'Hits' don't necessarily mean killed and wounded; they can also mean a deterioration in command and control - the effect of 'aimed' skirmisher fire could have an effect out of proportion to the numbers of killed and wounded if those killed were predominantly officers and NCO. That certainly comes across in some of the more recent accounts of the 100 days - e.g., Andrew Field's books. Having written all of that, if enough players want a v2 with nerfed skirmisher effectiveness, they should get that. After all, I can stick with v1. :)

2. I also like the split charge - melee sequence and actually don't prefer the Pickett's Charge version - but different flavours for different folks.

3. I don't have an issue with the volley / artillery fire charts. It does come down to various ways to generate 'hits' on the enemy. I can see why a common system has the virtue of simplicity but I wouldn't buy a v2 for that.

4. Command and Control - I'd be curious to see what DB concocts. C2 is difficult to 'model', so there's always room for improvement. However, by and large I'm more satisfied with the GdA approach compared to any other 'activation' based rules I've come across.

One minor tweak to the grenadier rule - veteran for DT and for the charge resolution?

Okay...that was more than 2 cents. More like 4 bits - kudos if you figure out that reference. :)
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zabarr
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Re: GDA2

Post by zabarr »

DCRBrown wrote: Fri Jun 25, 2021 8:12 pm The Hesitant debate is very interesting.

First, Hesitancy does drop to barely 11% when using a Brigade attachment. So, down from 33% to 11% if you are focusing on command. Suddenly just a 1 chance in 9 seems pretty reasonable, if you are choosing this command decision above others.

I think the fact that GdA does not have a "command bonus" for troops beyond a certain distance from the enemy ruling, as found in some other rule sets, can cause a furrowed brow to some gamers. So perhaps it's an opportune moment to illustrate my rationale regarding Hesitant.

First, Hesitant does not represent a Brigade suddenly stopping and doing absolutely nothing for the turn, rather like Grouchy eating strawberries from the film Waterloo! Things will be happening but either more slowly or far more likely it's other factors taking over as explained below.

Hesitant when close to the Enemy.

When a brigade is in close proximity to the enemy it has limited options. It can still move and fire but obviously it can't "move" very well because it's basically in contact with the enemy. Suddenly commands such as changing formation or redeploying battalions become far more difficult. A brigade will likely go "Hesitant" simply because it's committed to combat and in combat things do go wrong.

Hesitant when not close to the Enemy.

There is however, quite a bit of evidence to suggest that units further away from battle were no more likely to move more efficiently than units closer to the battle lines, in fact they had far more opportunity to be slower. Why?

When separated from the enemy by a reasonable distance Brigadiers had the opportunity to take a far more wary stance precisely because they are not up close and personal with the enemy. They knew that they would only get one shot at an attack once they closed in, so they needed to get it right! And it's that "fear" or "determination" to make sure your command has done everything it can to ensure success that causes Hesitancy.

It's not proximity to the enemy at all; in fact it's the reverse IMHO. Being further way from the enemy gives commanders the time to prepare and double-check resulting in Hesitancy whilst they ensure Brigade readiness – a luxury they will not get when closer to the enemy. So what are they doing? When further way they have the opportunity to get formations right, have a final orders check with officers, ensure all officers are correctly positioned, double-check battalion alignments, ensure the officer in charge of the skirmishers has deployed correctly, etc, etc, i.e. to dither, to fuss about or do the final command checks prior to an attacking or defensive action- thus to "Hesitate".

After all if the Brigadier fails, very direct and public questions will be asked by the C-in-C about why the attack or defence failed!

I certainly accept the fact that when moving a brigade well outside enemy contact it could move faster and quicker than those brigades in the battle line. But this does not remove or even reduce the chance that the Brigadier will "Hesitate" as already stated being further away simply provides the opportunity to hesitate. Perhaps this is why some French units took ages to deploy at Quatre Bras. And why D'Erlon's approach to form up at Waterloo also took ages. Perhaps the best example of this is, I think at the Battle of Chattanooga, where the right flank of the Confederate army was supposed to attack at dawn but had not even moved out several hours later!

Personally, I've been in numerous "command situations" where there was a great deal of fussing about prior to zero hour. Senior officers coming up to me and double checking my orders, my deployments, where my reserves where, etc, etc. Why did they do this - because they wanted to get it right and if it when wrong they would take the blame and any promotion chances they had would disappear! And I think that is exactly what our Napoleonic brigadiers are doing when they go "Hesitant".

Also Napoleonic Brigadiers do not have the helicopter view that gamers have, so although you might know that there are no enemy within a certain distance your poor general does not and might well be halting the brigade to ensure that that sound of cavalry across to the left is in fact friendly!

GdA acknowledges the fact that there is simply more opportunity for commanders to delay or micro-manage when further away from the enemy, as this opportunity for final adjustments was lost as soon as the brigade closed up on the enemy and it also accounts for the fact they do not have a God like view over the battlefield.

DB
This is such a fascinating post, and super timely since I just finished reading "War Games" by Leo Murray, all about the psychology of combat. I strongly recommend it, you may find some great gems here to work into brainstorming for new rules. Keep up the great work by the way, your wargame rules are fantastic. I wish I could play them all, I'm limited by how much I can paint and store, the typical wargamer's curse.
Otto
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Re: GDA2

Post by Otto »

"First, Hesitancy does drop to barely 11% when using a Brigade attachment. So, down from 33% to 11% if you are focusing on command. Suddenly just a 1 chance in 9 seems pretty reasonable...."

Hi Dave, not sure that is correct unless you are rolling 2 dice. When you roll a second time your chance on that roll are exactly the same as they were first time around - so still 33%. That is why when you have one brigade go hesitant the next one might do the same as it's chances don't change. If you really want to lower the chance of a brigade becoming hesitant because it has an attached ADC then you probably need to roll 2 dice with a sore of 2 or 3 resulting in hesitancy.

While on the subject of hesitancy. one aspect the rules that don't model so well is when a brigade has attack orders, successfully starts and then goes hesitant. I know the rationale is the they have run into some sort of problem and that obviously did happen but what about the brigades that launched attacks and the couldn't be stopped even with with threatening enemy? I'm thinking of situations like D'Erlon's attack at Waterloo and and the Heavy Cavalry charge that routed it. As you have said, we as tabletop generals have a helicopter view and even with ADC's et al still have a better level of command and control than any real life general - even in the 21st century. :geek:
Peter
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Re: GDA2

Post by Peter »

Otto, the 11% chance of failure when you have an ADC is the total chance of failure (33% of 33‰), since you need only one success from two chances.
Peter
Otto
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Re: GDA2

Post by Otto »

Thanks Peter, the point I was trying to make is that chance theory is all fine but doesn’t work out that way in real life or tabletop battles. Since most GdA battles have at least 5 brigades a side, theory would suggest that when rolling 5 dice only one or two at most should go hesitant yet I’ve seen three in a row do it.
Marshal Rob
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Re: GDA2

Post by Marshal Rob »

Hi All,
In general I would say don't change anything, but improve the layout and clarity - precision of the rules.
However - We play in 6 mm, so have more space on the table. The grand tactical move speeds need to be reconsidered for this scale.
The idea of giving Div and Corps commanders some influence in this aspect seems good, especially regarding individual quality.

Regarding Skirmisher fire - this is the one aspect that brought me to GdA and back to Napoleonics - It is too often abstracted to nothing in rules sets and marginalized, and I think Dave got it right. So, please, no change here. I don't know enough about the histors of skirmishing against deployed batteries, but would be willing to accept a 6 to hit. Skirmishing could also further facilitate Grand tactical movement - it was part of their role to report the conditions in advance of the main body - not just snipe at the officers.

One point to make regarding rules clarity but have to get back to work - watch this space.
Cheers
Marshal Rob

Hi Again,
Here is an example of an unclear rule - is it in fact a rule? Page 43 example supports in a charge - case B. It says the rear column may support the lead column...then "It cannot, however, join any potential melee." Is this a rule? - or - Where are the rules about what supports can join ..."any potential melee"? It can reinforce a melee from the rear, by contacting the rear of the friendly unit - page 90
This is not clear and why the distinction in diagram B?
As usual I am probably missing something. And thanks again Dave it is a very good game as is.
Cheers
Marshal Rob
Last edited by Marshal Rob on Thu Jul 01, 2021 5:18 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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